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Abstract
Recent empirical evidence based on ﬁrm level data emphasizes ﬁrm heterogeneity in innova-
tion activities and the diﬀerent eﬀects of process and product innovations on the productivity
level and productivity growth. To match this evidence, this paper develops an endogenous
growth model with two sources of ﬁrm heterogeneity: production eﬃciency and product qual-
ity. Both attributes evolve endogenously through ﬁrms’ innovation choices. Growth is driven
by innovation and self-selection of ﬁrms and sustained by entrants who imitate incumbents.
Calibrating the economy to match the Spanish manufacturing sector, the model enables to
quantify the diﬀerent eﬀects of selection, innovation, and imitation as well as product and
process innovation on growth. Compared to single attribute models of ﬁrm heterogeneity, the
model provides a more complete characterization of ﬁrms’ innovation choices explaining the
partition of ﬁrms along diﬀerent innovation strategies and generating consistent ﬁrm size dis-
tributions.
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11 Introduction
Globalization and the rise of new technologies have challenged ﬁrms’ abilities in devel-
oping innovation strategies to face increasing market competition. Innovation has become
a fundamental source of ﬁrm survival and growth.1 The literature has widely analyzed the
relationship between innovation and economic growth. However, little attention has been
paid to the relationship between ﬁrm heterogeneity and innovation activities and even less
to the relationship between ﬁrm heterogeneity and diﬀerent innovation strategies as well
as to their impact on ﬁrms’ competitiveness and productivity growth. The channel be-
tween ﬁrm growth and aggregate growth is still comparatively unexplored. Understanding
the determinants of ﬁrms’ innovation strategies and the mechanism of resource reallocation
through which they impact on aggregate growth is therefore crucial and can also contribute
to enhance the eﬀectiveness of policies aimed at fostering economic growth and welfare.
This paper proposes a new framework to analyze the eﬀects of process and product
innovation on ﬁrm dynamics and growth, highlighting the importance of product quality
in the growth process. For this purpose, an endogenous growth model with two sources
of ﬁrm heterogeneity, production eﬃciency and product quality is developed. Calibrating
the model to match the Spanish manufacturing sector, it generates moments and a ﬁrm size
distribution consistent with recent empirical evidence on innovation and ﬁrm dynamics. The
interplay between the two sources of ﬁrm heterogeneity and costly innovation results in a
non-monotonic relation between ﬁrm size and innovation strategies. Small ﬁrms undertake
product innovation, medium ﬁrms both process and product innovation while large ﬁrms
specialize only in process innovation. Moreover, it is emphasized the importance of the
reallocation of resources not only from less eﬃcient ﬁrms to more eﬃcient ones, but also
among diﬀerent innovation strategies. In this respect, the model yields interesting predictions
that can be empirically tested. In particular, innovation appears to be the main factor in
explaining aggregate growth: 91.87% of growth is due to innovation while only 8.13% is due
to the ﬁrms’ turnover. Moreover, process innovation explains 69.8% of aggregate growth
1For instance, Huergo and Jaumandreu (2007) estimate that the contribution of ﬁrms that perform R&D
explains between 45% and 85% of productivity growth in the industry with intermediate or high innovation
activity. Moreover, Bartelsman and Doms (2000) report evidence of a self-reinforcing mechanism between
productivity and innovation. Proﬁtable ﬁrms have a higher propensity to innovate and innovation is positively
related with productivity and productivity growth.
2while product innovation contributes only for the remaining 30.2%. Additionally, this model
contributes to the literature that tries to undertand why ﬁrm heterogenity is persistent
endogenizing the evolution of ﬁrm technology.
Existing growth literature distinguishes between only two types of innovations: horizon-
tal innovation which expands the number of varieties in the market, and vertical innovation
which increases the quality or reduces the production cost of existing goods. In these models
quality improvement (product innovation) or cost reduction (process innovation) are seen as
interchangeable and yield the same prediction. Contrastingly, recent surveys at ﬁrm-level
allow to distinguish when ﬁrms undertake process or product innovation highlighting that
ﬁrms perceive in a diﬀerent way product quality improvement or cost reduction innovations.2
Firms not only have diﬀerent incentives to invest either in product or process innovation,
or even in both simultaneously, but also their impact on ﬁrms’ pricing strategies, produc-
tivity, and TFP growth is diﬀerent. Three main pieces of evidence arise from these surveys:
innovations are heterogeneous, asymmetric, and complementary.
Firstly, innovation are heterogeneous in the sense that some ﬁrms do not innovate, some
ﬁrms specialize in process innovation, others in product innovation and some in both types of
innovations. Table 1 shows the share of ﬁrms across the diﬀerent innovation strategies for four
European countries.3 Jaumandreu (2003) in a sample of Spanish ﬁrms in the manufacturing
sectors ﬁnds that half of the ﬁrms never innovate, 30% undertake either process or product
innovation and 20% of the ﬁrms undergo both types of innovations. Similar statistics are
also available for Germany and Great Britain (Harrison et all, (2008)) and the Netherlands
(Ceﬁs and Marsili, (2005)).
2The European Commission has developed a program aimed at studying the innovation systems of the
states member of the European Union with the scope of promoting innovation and growth. The core of the
program is based on ﬁrm-level surveys (Community Innovation Surveys) which ask detailed questions about
the innovation investments of ﬁrms distinguishing between cost reducing innovations and quality improving
innovations. This information is then merged with structural and macroeconomic data drawn from OECD
surveys. Additionally, some European Countries carry out nation-speciﬁc surveys. For instance, in Spain
there is the Encuestas Sobre Estrategias Empresariales that is issued every three years. The same analysis
becomes more diﬃcult with American data where innovation is measured as patents and therefore the two
innovations cannot be distinguished. However, for a concise summary Klette and Kortum (2004) report a
list of stylized facts concerning ﬁrm R&D, innovation, and productivity.
3It should be noticed that the data sets are not homogeneous. Hence table 1 does not allow comparisons
across countries but only the ability to observe the stated heterogeneity in the innovation choices.
3Table 1: Heterogeneity in Innovation Strategies
Country Share of Innovative Firms
No Innovation Process Product Process and Product
Spain 55.4% 12.2% 12.4% 20%
Germany 41% 10.2% 21% 27.4%
Great Britain 60.5% 11% 14.2% 14.3%
Netherlands 36.6% 5.8% 18.8% 42.7%
Secondly, the innovation strategies are asymmetric. Huergo and Jamandreu (2004) esti-
mate that process innovation increases productivity by 14% and product innovation by 4%
over a three year period. As expected, innovating ﬁrms are characterized by a productivity
distribution that stochastically dominates the productivity distribution of non-innovators.
But in the case of product innovation the distribution becomes more skewed to the right.
Thirdly, innovations are complements. Process innovation is more frequent than product
innovation, while the probability of introducing a product innovation is higher for ﬁrms that
also introduce a process innovation in the same period. However process innovation does
not necessarily imply product innovation. Firms innovate on their existing products, aiming
at increasing product diﬀerentiation and hence prices, in the hope of exploiting consumers’
willingness to pay for a higher quality good. Instead process innovation increases the ﬁrms’
production eﬃciency. This leads to higher ﬁrm productivity, lower prices and a larger scale of
production. Complementarity between process and product innovation then arises: product
innovation allows new product designs but these new designs become proﬁtable only when
they are aﬀordable for the consumers.
When talking about ﬁrm dynamics it is important not to abstract from entry and exit.
They play an important role in explaining the reallocation of resources from less productive
ﬁrms to more productive ﬁrms and therefore growth. In addition, exit is associated with a
lower level of pre-exit innovations, while entrants present a high probability of innovation.
Standard models with only one source of innovation cannot explain all these pieces of
evidence. The literature on heterogeneous ﬁrms is usually based only on one factor of
heterogeneity, either cost eﬃciency or the ability of producing quality. In these models
4a single attribute monotonically predicts ﬁrms’ revenue, competitiveness, and innovation.
This characteristic then implies a threshold ﬁrm size above which all ﬁrms innovate and
below none do. This paper takes the gap between the existing theoretical literature and the
pieces of empirical evidence as a starting point and links ﬁrm level growth due to diﬀerent
innovation choices, the process of resources reallocation, and aggregate growth. For this
scope, a general equilibrium heterogeneous ﬁrms model with endogenous product and process
innovation is developed. The industry structure is taken from Hopenhayn (1992) and the
competitive structure from Melitz (2003), using monopolistic competition instead of perfect
competition. Firms produce diﬀerentiated goods and are heterogeneous in their production
eﬃciency and in their product quality. The evolution of both eﬃciency and quality is given
by a stochastic permanent component and by an endogenous component proportional to the
optimal investment decision taken by the ﬁrm. In each period non proﬁtable incumbents exit
the industry, implying that the average productivity of the remaining ﬁrms increases. New
ﬁrms enter in the market as in Gabler and Licandro (2005) and Luttmer (2007). They try
to imitate the average incumbent, they do not succeed completely but on average entrants
are more productive than exiting ﬁrms increasing the average productivity of the industry.
Growth arises due to ﬁrms’ innovation and ﬁrms’ self-selection and is sustained endogenously
by entrants’ imitation.
In this model the relationship between ﬁrm size and innovative strategies is more ar-
ticulate in explaining why diﬀerent ﬁrms choose optimally diﬀerent innovation strategies.
Additionally, comparing industries that diﬀer for innovation costs or for entry barriers al-
lows for a better understanding of the growth rate composition and how it is aﬀected by
changes in the industry structure. Hence this model provide a suitable framework for the
analysis of policy implications aimed at fostering growth.
1.1 Related Literature
This paper attempts to link the literature on ﬁrm dynamics and endogenous growth the-
ory by explicitly modeling diﬀerent types of ﬁrm-level innovations. As in the seminal models
of Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992), innovation
is ﬁrm-speciﬁc and it is motivated by the appropriation of the revenues associated with a
successful R&D investment. In Romer (1990) growth is driven by two elements. The ﬁrst
one is the invention of new inputs which make the production of the ﬁnal good sector more
5eﬃcient. In this sense and from the point of view of the ﬁnal good ﬁrm it can be seen as
process innovation. The second one is knowledge spillovers from past R&D: the higher the
stock of knowledge, the easier the invention of new varieties. In this paper there is a similar
spillover, which is the imperfect imitation of incumbent ﬁrms by entrants. Grossman and
Helpman (1991) introduce growth through quality improving innovation of existing products.
However, in their model, diﬀerent qualities are perceived as perfect substitutes and hence the
representative consumer buys only the cheapest variety (adjusted by quality). Instead, in my
model each variety is perceived as diﬀerent by the consumer and higher quality varieties give
higher utility. In Aghion and Howitt (1992) growth is based on the idea of Schumpeterian
creative destruction in which new innovations replace the previous ones driving the incum-
bent monopolist out of the industry. The creative destruction mechanism is not far from the
idea of ﬁrm selection. Successful ﬁrms grow and drive out of the market unsuccessful ones.
Based on these general features my work adds ﬁrm heterogeneity, permanent idiosyncratic
shocks that hit both production eﬃciency and product quality, and endogenous investment
choices made by incumbent ﬁrms. These new elements endogenously link aggregate growth
with ﬁrm-speciﬁc growth and hence with the mechanism of resource reallocation from non-
innovators to innovators and from exiting to active ﬁrms. The resulting distribution of ﬁrm
size is consistent with the data.
The idea of ﬁrm selection was already present in Jovanovic (1982). He introduces the ﬁrst
model with ﬁrm-speciﬁc stochastic productivities with unknown mean but known variance.
As time goes by ﬁrms learn their productivity and the ineﬃcient ﬁrms exit. As ﬁrms learn
their productivity the eﬀects of selection on ﬁrms evolution dies out and eventually the
industry converges to a stationary equilibrium without entry and exit. For this reason, this
paper takes the industry structure from Hopenhayn (1992), who develops a partial dynamics
stochastic heterogeneous ﬁrms’ model which generates a stationary equilibrium with entry
and exit that is capable of studying the eﬀects of structural changes in the industry on
the distribution of ﬁrm size and age. Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) analyze the general
equilibrium of the Hopenhayn model focusing on the process of labor reallocation. Both
papers study the stationary equilibrium in which each ﬁrm is hit by shocks characterized by
a stationary AR(1) process. However, both papers focus only on ﬁrm productivity growth
between cohorts and disregard the eﬀects on aggregate growth.
The link between the process of resource reallocation due to selection at the ﬁrm level
6and economic growth is studied in Gabler and Licandro (2005) and in Luttmer (2007). In
both papers ﬁrm technology is hit by permanent shocks which together with ﬁrm selection
and entrant imitation generates endogenous growth. The resulting stationary distribution is
a consequence of the knowledge spillover that links the distribution of entrants productivities
to the distribution of incumbents productivities. This assumption is necessary to generate
endogenous growth. In fact without imitation, as incumbent ﬁrms become more productive
through selection, the incentives to enter the industry diminish and eventually vanish. In
the end no new ﬁrms enter into the industry and the equilibrium is characterized by the
absence of entry and exit similarly as Jovanovic (1982). Gabler and Licandro (2005) model
a competitive equilibrium with heterogeneous ﬁrms using both labor and capital as inputs.
When calibrating their model on US data they show that selection and imitation account
for a ﬁfth of productivity growth. This represents a lower bound. Luttmer (2007) instead
considers a monopolistic competition market in which each ﬁrm produces a diﬀerent variety
and it is subjected to shocks to both productivity and demand. Calibrating his model to US
data he ﬁnds that half of output growth can be attributed to selection and imitation. This
can be seen as an upper bound.
This paper attempts to extend Gabler and Licandro (2005) and Luttmer (2007) by consid-
ering alongside their models the role of innovation in linking ﬁrm level growth to aggregate
growth. Modeling endogenously ﬁrm innovation investments in both ﬁrm eﬃciency and
product quality can help to distinguish the diﬀering contributions of selection and imitation
versus innovation in process and product when explaining economic growth.
The other papers that shed light on the relationship between innovation, ﬁrm heterogene-
ity and the role of resource reallocation of the growth process are Klette and Kortum (2004)
and Lenz and Mortensen (2008). The former, building on Grossman and Helpman (1991),
introduces ﬁrms that exogenously diﬀer in the proﬁts earned by selling their own products.
Endogenous growth is then generated through innovation investments aimed at increasing
the number of goods produced by each ﬁrm and ﬁrms adjust the production lines in response
to their own and competitors’ investment in R&D. However they posit permanent exogenous
diﬀerences across ﬁrm proﬁtability and hence across the size of the innovative step. This
simpliﬁcation results in a distribution of innovative ﬁrms that have the same volatility as
the distribution of the ﬁrms that do not innovate. This model, deﬁning innovation as an
endogenous drift into the stochastic evolution of ﬁrm productivity and quality, can account
7for the diﬀering variances of the distribution of innovators and non-innovators. Lenz and
Mortensen (2008) relate to Klette and Kortum (2004) introducing heterogeneity in the ex-
pected productivity of the new variety produced. But as in both models the engine of growth
is a mechanism of creative destruction on the numbers of goods existing in the economy at
a given point in time, they can analyze only one channel of innovation.
More recently, Atkeson and Burstein (2007) address the relation between the decision of
heterogeneous ﬁrms to innovate and engage in international trade by introducing two types
of stochastic innovation activities. Though their model abstracts from endogenous growth,
they deﬁne as process innovation the decision to increase the stock of ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors
that then translates in higher proﬁts opportunities. This is analogous to process innovation
deﬁned in this model. They deﬁne as product innovation the creation of a new ﬁrm and
hence a new product. This is the analogous to ﬁrm entry discussed in this model. In fact, this
model deﬁnes diﬀerently from them as product innovation the decision of ﬁrms to improve
the quality of an exiting variety. Moreover, the jump in the eﬃciency and/or quality scale
are, in this paper, proportional to the research intensity.
Finally two other papers of note, Melitz (2003) and Hallak and Sivadasan (2008). Melitz
(2003) proposes a static model with heterogeneous ﬁrms in which the exposure to interna-
tional trade increases ﬁrm selection and generates a partition among ﬁrms such that the
more productive ﬁrms are the ones who gain access foreign markets. Hallak and Sivadasan
(2008), building on Melitz (2003), introduce a partial and static equilibrium model in which
ﬁrms diﬀer in two attributes: labor eﬃciency and ability to produce high quality varieties.
Under the assumption of minimum quality requirements they study how openness aﬀects
ﬁrm distribution. In their model as in Melitz (2003) the partition of ﬁrms between domestic
producers and exporters is generated by the presence of a ﬁxed cost to enter the foreign
market. Here the same mechanism is used to generate the partition of ﬁrms among the
diﬀerent innovation strategies. However, the ﬁrm partition and the eﬀects on the size distri-
bution of ﬁrms is not the result of a one-shot change but it is the result of the combination
of permanent shocks on both states and inter-temporal innovation decisions.
2 The Model
This section develops a general equilibrium model in discrete time with inﬁnite horizon.
82.1 Consumer Problem
The representative consumer maximizes his utility choosing consumption and supplying







where β < 1 is the discount factor and t is the time index. In every period the consumer
faces the problem of maximizing his current consumption across a continuum of diﬀerentiated
products indexed by i ∈ I where I is a measure of the available varieties in the economy.
Speciﬁcally, the preferences are represented by an augmented Dixit-Stiglitz utility function
with constant elasticity of substitution between any two goods σ = 1/(1 − α) > 1 with









where x(i) is the quantity of variety i ∈ I and q(i) is the quality of variety i ∈ I. This utility
function is augmented to account for quality variation across products and quality acts as a
utility shifter: for a given price the consumer prefers products with high quality rather than
products with low quality.
The representative consumer maximizes his utility subject to the budget constraint Et =
 
i∈I pt(i)xt(i)di where Et is total expenditure at time t and pt(i) is the price of variety i ∈ I






























and Xt = Ut. (4)
Pt is the price quality index at time t of all the bundle of varieties consumed and Xt is the
aggregate set of varieties consumed.




= β(1 + rt). (5)
where rt is the return on asset holding.
92.2 Firms
This section outlines a dynamic two factor heterogeneous ﬁrm model. The ﬁrst source of
heterogeneity is production eﬃciency, a(i) ∈ R++, which increases the marginal productivity
of labor, as in the seminal paper of Hopenhayn (1992), and the second source is quality of the
ﬁrm’s variety, q(i) ∈ R++\(0,1), which decreases the marginal productivity of labor. In this
respect, a higher quality variety has a higher variable cost as in Verhoogen (2008). Firms
are distributed over productivity and quality.    (a,q) =  (a,q)I is deﬁned as the measure of
ﬁrm with state (a,q) at time t, where I is the number of ﬁrms in the industry and  (a,q)
is a density function. It is assumed that each ﬁrm produces only one variety so that the
index i identiﬁes both the ﬁrm and the corresponding variety produced by that ﬁrms and I
represents both the set of varieties and the mass of incumbent ﬁrms active in the industry.
The following deﬁnition are used, A is the set of all production eﬃciencies, Q is the set of
all product qualities, and Ω ≡ A × Q is the state space.
2.2.1 Production Decision
After paying a ﬁxed operational cost, cf, expressed in terms of labor, active ﬁrms receive
their new technology level, (a,q). Firms produce and price their own products under the
assumption of monopolistic competition. The production decision is particularly simple
since it involves only an intra-temporal dimension of proﬁt maximization given consumer
demand and ﬁrm technology. Close to Hallak and Sivadasan (2008), the production function
is assumed to be linear in labor, n, which is the unique input, increasing in ﬁrm eﬃciency, a,
and decreasing in ﬁrm product quality, q. That is, xt(i) = at(i)qt(i)−ηnt(i) with η ∈ (0,1).
The parameter η introduces asymmetry between ﬁrm eﬃciency and product quality and
measures the diﬃculties in producing a higher quality variety: the higher η, the more diﬃcult
and costly it becomes to produce a high quality product. This particular functional form is
justiﬁed by empirical evidence: it generates a price distribution consistent with the estimates
of Smolny (1998) and moreover complementarity between process and product innovation is
obtained.
The proﬁt maximization problem, faced by each ﬁrm, is formulated as:
πt(a(i),q(i)) = max
p(i)
pt(i)xt(i) − wtnt(i) − cf (6)
where wt is the wage rate at time t common to all ﬁrms. The ﬁrst order condition with







1/α is the constant mark-up associated with the CES demand function. In contrast to the
standard models with a single factor of ﬁrm heterogeneity, ﬁrms’ prices depend on both ﬁrms’
eﬃciency and quality of their products. Consistent with both the theoretical predictions and
the empirical estimates, the price schedule is increasing in the quality of the variety produced
by the ﬁrms and decreasing in ﬁrms’ eﬃciency.4 As in Melitz (2003) the nominal wage is










Firm output is an increasing function of both the aggregates and of the eﬃciency level of
ﬁrms. The relationship between product quality and output is ambiguous and depends on the
comparison between α, related to consumer preferences, and η, coming from ﬁrm production
function. If η > α then ﬁrm output is decreasing in the product quality: high quality
varieties are characterized by a relatively lower market share. In this case, the positive eﬀect
of quality on consumer utility is completely oﬀset by the related high market price. The
opposite is true when α > η, though this last scenario appears to be counterfactual.












Labor input is an increasing function of both ﬁrms’ state variables. Consequently, ﬁrms with
more advanced technology demand more labor input. Finally, the net per period proﬁt of









t Et − cf. (10)
4Smolny (1998), studying a panel of West German ﬁrms in the manufacturing sector in the period 1980-
1992, estimates that product innovation increases the probability and the frequency of positive net prices
increases by more than 18% while process innovation does not reveal a conclusive eﬀect on ﬁrm pricing
strategies. However, he clearly estimates that process innovations increases the probability of employment
and especially output increases. Making increases in output and employment without a lower price is diﬃcult.
Hence the eﬀects on output and employment support the relevance of price eﬀects and of the complementarity
between the two forms of innovation.
11Although product quality has an ambiguous eﬀect on the optimal output of ﬁrms, proﬁts
are increasing in both labor eﬃciency and product quality. This provides incentives for ﬁrms
to improve endogenously their position in the technology distribution via ﬁrms’ innovation
policies. In this respect, the model predicts that a change in eﬃciency impacts more a ﬁrm’s
proﬁt than a change in quality.
The diﬀerent eﬀects of ﬁrm eﬃciency and quality on the monopolistic price, on the output,
and on the proﬁts provide a suitable framework in which to study the interplay among
diﬀerent innovation choices taken by a ﬁrm and their eﬀects on a ﬁrm’s competitiveness.5
2.2.2 Innovation Decision
Firms receive idiosyncratic permanent shocks on both states. That is, ﬁrms’ log eﬃciency
and log quality follow a random walk. This is a way of capturing the role of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
characteristics and the persistence of ﬁrm productivity which is established in the empirical
literature.6 Besides the exogenous random walks, ﬁrms can endogenously aﬀect the evolution
of their states through private innovation activities. In line with the terminology used in
the surveys at the ﬁrm-level, this paper identify two diﬀerent types of innovation: process
innovation and product innovation. Process innovation refers to the decision of ﬁrms to
invest labor, with the aim of lowering ﬁrm production costs, while product innovation refers
to the decision of ﬁrms to direct labor investment at increasing the quality of the varieties
produced.
According to the theoretical growth literature, the beneﬁts derived by ﬁrms’ innovation
investments are proportional to the amount of resources spent. In particular, it is assumed
that innovation introduces an endogenous drift in the random walk processes which reﬂects
the amount of variable labor that ﬁrms optimally invest in R&D. The innovation choice is
history dependent as today investment in process or product innovation results in tomorrow
higher ﬁrm production eﬃciency and/or product quality. In addition, ﬁrms have to pay also
a ﬁxed cost of innovation, ca and cq, for process and product innovation, respectively. This
5An innovation in product, aimed at increasing product quality, results in a higher market price for the
given variety and, for appropriate parameters, in a contraction of the market quota. This then determines
an incentive to invest also in process innovation and hence to increase ﬁrm eﬃciency. That in turn leads to
a lower market price and to an unambiguous larger market share.
6For instance, the idiosyncratic shocks can capture factors as absorption techniques, managerial ability,
gain and losses due to the change in the labor composition and so on.
12is a way of capturing the costs necessary to set up an R&D department, to conduct mar-
ket analysis and technically it determines the partition of ﬁrms among diﬀerent innovation
strategies. Depending on the ﬁrms’ technology state, some ﬁrms decide to innovate either in
process or in product or in both types of innovation. In whichever form innovation comes, it
represents a ﬁrst source of endogenous growth since it shifts the bivariate ﬁrms’ distribution
to the right.






t+1 when zt = 0
logat + λa logzt(a,q) + εaz
t+1 otherwise .
(11)






variance of the random walk when innovation does not occur and σ2
az is the variance of the
process when innovation takes place. zt(a,q) > 0 is the labor that a ﬁrm with states (a,q)
decide optimally to invest in process innovation. λa > 0 is a parameter that, together with
the log form of the innovation drift, scales the eﬀects of innovation. The log functional form
chosen for the innovation drift is important as together with ﬁrm selection assure a bounded







t+1 when lt = 0












ql are the two variances without and
with innovation. lt(a,q) is the variable labor devoted to product innovation and λq > 0 is
the related scale parameter. The means of the eﬃciency and quality shocks are normalized
to zero eliminating exogenous sources of growth. In fact, abstracting from innovation and
ﬁrm selection, in expectation ﬁrms do not grow.
The random component ε is independent both across ﬁrms and over time. Moreover,
the two processes, eﬃciency and quality, are independent.7 Deﬁne the density function of
at+1 conditional on at as f(at+1|at), and the density functions of qt+1 conditional on qt as
p(qt+1|qt).
The transition of the two state variables depends on the ﬁrms’ innovation decisions and
the idiosyncratic shocks. Considering jointly the two transition functions, Φ : Ω → Ω can
7This simpliﬁcation does not aﬀect qualitatively the model predictions, but has the advantage to narrow
the set of parameters necessary to calibrate since it is possible to ignore the covariances of the two processes.
13be deﬁned as the joint transition function, which moves ﬁrms’ quality and eﬃciency states.
The corresponding transition probability function is deﬁned as φ : Ω × Ω → [0,1], which
gives the probability of going from state (a,q) to state (a′,q′). The transition probability
takes diﬀerent forms depending on the innovation decisions and on the exit decision deﬁned
below. If the two processes are independent then φ( ) = f( )p( ).
2.2.3 Firm Value Function
Incumbent ﬁrms face a dynamic optimization problem of maximizing their expected value.
Once abstracted from the innovation decision this is a particularly simple problem since it
is a sequence of static optimizations. With the innovation scheme, current investments in
innovation aﬀect the transition probabilities and thus the value of future technology. This
generates a dynamic interplay between ﬁrm technology and the innovative position taken by






The max operator indicates that in each period ﬁrms face diﬀerent discrete choices which
depend on the current level of production eﬃciency and product quality. vP(a,q) is the value
when no innovation investments occurred, vA(a,q) when a ﬁrm produces and innovates in
process, vAQ(a,q) when both process and product innovation are undertaken and vQ(a,q)
when a ﬁrm specializes only in product innovation.
Using J = {P,A,Q,AQ} and deﬁning with prime the next period variables, the Belman






















where πP(a,q) is given by equation (11), πA(a,q) = π(a,q) − z(a,q) − ca, πAQ(a,q) =
π(a,q) − (z(a,q) + l(a,q)) − ca − cq, and πQ(a,q) = π(a,q) − l(a,q) − cq.
These value functions characterize a partition of ﬁrms among the diﬀerent decisions (only
produce or produce and innovate, and in the latter case if process, or product or both at the
same time) which depends on the relation between the technological state of each ﬁrm and
the ﬁxed costs. In fact, given the speciﬁc position of a ﬁrm inside the bivariate distribution of
technology, the ﬁxed costs of innovation generate diﬀerent ﬁrms decisions consistently with
equation (14). Two sources of ﬁrm heterogeneity implies that the thresholds, characterizing
14the border among the diﬀerent innovation strategies, are given by inﬁnite combinations of
(a,q) couples. For this reason, it becomes convenient to express the reservation values in
terms eﬃciency as a function of quality, a(q) and to obtain cutoﬀ functions rather than
cutoﬀ values as in one factor heterogeneous ﬁrm models. For given q ∈ Q it is possible to
deﬁne the following cutoﬀ functions: aA(q) delimits the area in which process innovation is
optimal, aQ(q) delimits the area in which product innovation is optimal, and aAQ(q) delimits
the area in which both innovations are chosen by the ﬁrms.8 Appendix A provides a formal
deﬁnition of these cutoﬀ functions.
The cutoﬀ functions are decreasing in q, highlighting a non-monotonic relation between
the innovation strategies and ﬁrms eﬃciency. In contrast with one factor heterogeneous ﬁrm
models, also less eﬃcient ﬁrms but characterized by a product with high quality innovate.
Notice that ﬁrm proﬁts, π(a,q), are increasing in both eﬃciency and quality generating the
incentives to innovate which are slowed down by the log form in which the innovation drift
is modeled. Abstracting from the discontinuity in the value function due to the ﬁxed costs
of innovation, the more advanced the ﬁrm technology, the higher the innovation investment
but the lower the beneﬁt due to the diminishing returns of innovation.
2.2.4 The Exit Decision
Firms exit the industry after a bad technological draw such that the expected value of
continuing is lower than the exit value which has been normalized to zero.9 Since ﬁrm value
is increasing in both states the exit reservation value is decreasing in both of them. Again a
cutoﬀ function ax(q) can be deﬁned such that:
E[v(a
′(q),q
′)|(ax(q),q)] = 0. (15)
For each quality level, there is a maximum eﬃciency level such that below this maximum
ﬁrm value is negative and therefore ﬁrms ﬁnd optimally to exit the industry. Interestingly,
the cutoﬀ function ax(q) is decreasing in quality: for given eﬃciency ﬁrms with a high quality
product can survive longer in the market when hit by a bad eﬃciency shock.
8It is equivalent to express product quality as a function of eﬃciency, q(a). Using a speciﬁc formulation
for the cutoﬀ function does not aﬀect the implications of the model.
9Notice that exit is triggered by the assumption of ﬁxed operational costs, cf, paid by active ﬁrms
in each period. Without ﬁxed operational costs, ﬁrms hit by bad shocks instead of exiting the market
could temporary shut down their production and just wait for better periods when positive shocks hit their
technology and then start again producing.
15Firms innovation decisions, exit and the law of motion of (a,q) deﬁne the transition
function ΦxI : A \ Ax × Q → (Ap ∪ AA ∪ AQ ∪ AAQ ∪ Ax) × Q where the support of
eﬃciency is partitioned into Ax = {(a,q) : a ∈ A,q ∈ Q : a(q) < ax(q)} (exit support),
AP = {(a,q) : a ∈ A,q ∈ Q ∧ v(a,q) = vP(a,q)} (production support), AA = {(a,q) :
a ∈ A,q ∈ Q ∧ v(a,q) = vA(a,q)} (process innovation support), AQ = {(a,q) : a ∈ A,q ∈
Q ∧ v(a(q),q) = vQ(a(q),q)} (product innovation support) and AAQ = {(a,q) : a ∈ A,q ∈
Q ∧ v(a(q),q) = vAQ(a(q),q)} (process and product innovation support). These partitions
diﬀer across diﬀerent elements of Q. The corresponding transition probability of going from
state (a,q) ∈ (Ap∪AA∪AQ∪AAQ)×Q to (a′,q′) ∈ (Ap∪AA∪AQ∪AAQ∪Ax)×Q is given
by a function φxI( ).
2.2.5 Firms Entry
Every period there is a mass of potential entrants in the industry which are a priori
identical. To enter ﬁrms have to pay a sunk entry cost, ce, expressed in terms of labor.
This cost can be interpreted as an irreversible investment into setting up the production
facilities. After paying the initial cost, ﬁrms draw their initial eﬃciency level, a, and their
initial product quality, q, from a common bivariate density function, γ(a,q). The associated
distribution is denoted by Γ(a,q) and has support in R+×R+. Deﬁne γe the mean of the joint
distribution and σ2
ea and σ2
eq the variances of the entrants eﬃciency and quality processes
(the covariance is zero given the current assumption of independence between the evolution
of the two states). In equilibrium the free entry condition holds: potential entrants enter





v(a,q)dΓ(a,q) = ce, (16)
Mt is the mass of ﬁrms that enter in the industry at time t. At the stationary equilibrium
also a stability condition needs to be satisﬁed: the mass of new entrants exactly replaces






The average technology of surviving ﬁrms grow due to randomness and innovation. This
implies that the demand of labor grows over time at a positive rate and, given a ﬁxed
exogenous supply, the wage rate rises. Hence, if the joint distribution of entrants eﬃciency
and quality, γ(a,q), was completely exogenous and constant, the expected value of entry
16would be driven to zero and no ﬁrms would eventually enter the market. To avoid this
scenario the entrants technology is linked to incumbent ﬁrms technology through an imitation
mechanisms related to Luttmer (2007) and used also in Gabler and Licandro (2005). Entrants
imitate incumbent ﬁrms: the mean of the entrant distribution is a constant fraction ψe ∈
(0,1) of the mean of the joint distribution of incumbents deﬁned as  . That is, γe =
ψe . Consistently with empirical evidence, entrants are on average less productive than
incumbents. However, as the distribution of incumbents shifts to the right due to growth, so
does the distribution of entrants due to imitation. Imitation is then needed to guarantee a
positive measure of new ﬁrms in every period and hence, together with selection, to assure the
existence of a stationary distribution. This knowledge spillover, that goes from incumbent
ﬁrms to entrants, is the only externality present in the model and combined with ﬁrm
selection and together with innovation generates endogenous growth.10
2.3 Cross Sectional Distribution and Aggregates
All ﬁrms’ choices and the processes for the idiosyncratic shocks yield the low of motion









































Tomorrow density is given by the contribution of all surviving ﬁrms (the domain of the
integrals is restricted to surviving ﬁrms only) and of entrants. The contribution of new ﬁrms
is represented by the last term of (21). The ﬁrst integral represents the share of surviving
ﬁrms that only produce and do not invest neither in process nor in product innovation, the
second integral shows the contribution of the ﬁrms that successfully produce and invest in
process innovation. The third one instead represents the ﬁrms that produce and undertake
both types of innovation and ﬁnally the forth one highlights the share of producers that
10Eeckhout and Jovanovic (2002) used a wider mechanisms of knowledge spillover in which all ﬁrms and
not only entering ﬁrms, can imperfectly imitate the whole population of ﬁrms.
17specialize in product innovation only.11
To summarize the information about the average ﬁrm eﬃciency and product quality, a













Notice that aq1−η is an index of ﬁrm level technology that maps one to one to ﬁrms’ proﬁts
and size. Diﬀering from Melitz (2003), this weighted mean not only depends on two states,
eﬃciency and quality of the ﬁrm variety, but also the weights reﬂect the relative quality ad-
justed output shares of ﬁrms with diﬀerent technology levels rather than the simple output
shares. Moreover, the weighted mean can be also seen as the aggregate technology incorpo-
rating all the information contained in  (a,q). In fact, it has the property that the aggregate
variables can be expressed as a function of only   disregarding the technology distribution,
 (a,q).12
2.4 Equilibrium Deﬁnition
In equilibrium the representative consumer maximizes its utility, ﬁrms maximize their
discounted expected proﬁt and markets clear. The stationary equilibrium of this economy
is a sequences of prices {pt}∞
t=0, {Pt}∞




n(a,q; ), z(a,q; ), l(a,q; ) v(a,q; ), cutoﬀ functions ax(q), aA(q), aAQ(q), and aQ(q) and
a sequence of probability density function { t}∞
t=0 such that:
• the representative consumer chooses asset holding and consumption optimally so that
to satisfy the Euler Equation (6),
• all active ﬁrms maximize their proﬁts choosing a price that satisﬁes (8) and employment
and innovation policies that satisfy n(a,q; ), z(a,q; ), and l(a,q; ) yielding the value
function v(a,q) as speciﬁed by equation (14) and its components,
11Since the industry is populated by a continuum of ﬁrms and only independent idiosyncratic shocks occurs
the aggregate distribution evolves deterministically. As a consequence, though the identity of any ﬁrms i
associated with a couple (a,q) is not determined, their aggregate measure is deterministic. For the same
reason the other aggregate variables evolve deterministically.
12See Appendix B for more details.
18• innovation is optimal such that the cutoﬀ functions aA(q), aAQ(q), and aQ(q) satisfy
the previous conditions,
• exit is optimal such that ax(q) is given by equation (19) and ﬁrms exit if a(q) < ax(q),
• entry is optimal: ﬁrms enter until equation (20) and the aggregate stability condition
are satisﬁed,
• the number of active ﬁrms I adjusts till the labor market clears: the aggregate demand






n(a,q) + l(a,q) + z(a,q)
 
















 (a,q)(ca + cr)dqda + Icf + Mce = N
s,
• the stationary distribution of ﬁrms evolves accordingly to (21) given  0, I, M and the
cutoﬀ values,




Q I (a,q), holds.
In equilibrium ax, aA, aAQ aQ, I and M are such that the sequence of ﬁrms distribution is
consistent with the law of motion generated by the entry and exit rules.13
3 Endogenous Growth
3.1 Balanced Growth Path
In general, on the Balanced Growth Path output, consumption, real wage, prices and
the aggregate technology grow at a constant rate, the bivariate distribution of eﬃciency and
quality shifts to the right by constant steps, its shape is time invariant, and the interest rate,
the aggregate expenditure, the aggregate proﬁt, the proﬁt and the labor demand distribu-
tions, the number of ﬁrms, the ﬁrm turnover rate, and the other characteristics of the ﬁrms’
distribution are constant.
13Hopenhayn (1992)’s paper proves the existence of equilibrium for similar economies.
19Deﬁne g as the average growth rate of ﬁrm productivity. That is the growth rate of the
mean of the joint distribution of eﬃciency and quality. It is given by a combination of the
growth rate of the eﬃciency state, denoted by ga, and of the growth rate of the product
quality state, indicated by gq. Intuitively, growth arises because in every period the log of
the joint aggregate technology shifts to the right by a factor g, meaning that the average
productivity and the average product quality of the industry grow. Deﬁning the growth
factors of ﬁrm eﬃciency and product quality by GA =
at+1
at = 1+ga and GQ =
qt+1
qt = 1+gq,
the Balanced Growth Path can be found as follows. From the labor market clearing condition,
given the assumption of a constant labor supply, Ns, also the number of incumbent ﬁrms, I,
and the number of entrants, M, have to be constant as well as the share of labor allocated
to production and innovation.14 Aggregate expenditure, E, has to be equal to the aggregate
labor income, Ns, given the wage normalization. This in turn implies that E is constant
and hence also Π has to be constant. The proﬁt distribution, equation (11), shows that
π(a,q) has to be constant because of constant ﬁxed operational costs. Given a constant
expenditure, proﬁts are constant only if aq1−ηP is constant. For positive growth rate of
the technology, the previous condition holds if the price index growth factor is inversely
related to the average technology growth factor, GP = (GAG
1−η
Q )−1. In other words, as the
industry grows and the average technology advances, the price index diminishes. With the
same reasoning also the distribution of manufacturing labor, equation (10), is time invariant,
which together with the labor market clearing condition implies that also the distributions
of the labor hired for the innovation activities, z(a,q) and l(a,q), are constant. From the
consumer problem E = PX, which holds only if the aggregate consumption X grows at a
constant factor (GAG
1−η
Q ). This results in a constant interest rate as shown by the Euler





which is lower than the growth rate of the price index. This is a consequence of the fact that
the price index is adjusted to consider the growth in the product quality. Finally, x(a,q)





A Balanced Growth Path equilibrium exists if there is a ga and a gq consistent with the
stationary equilibrium. To ﬁnd these growth rates and to characterize the equilibrium itself
and the stationary ﬁrms’ distribution it is necessary to transform the model such that all the
14If there was population growth then the number of varieties, and the number of entrant ﬁrms would
grow at the same rate as population grows.
20variables are constant along the Balanced Growth Path. Hence, all growing variables need
to be divided by the corresponding growth factor,   s = s/Gt
s and the stochastic processes
in eﬃciency and quality need to be de-trended by the respective growth rates, log  at =
logat−gat and log   qt = logqt−gqt, where “∼” denotes the stationarized variables. In expected
terms both average ﬁrm eﬃciency and average quality increase and thus in expectation in
every period each ﬁrm falls back relative to the distribution. This transformation aﬀects
also the transition functions and hence log eﬃciency and log quality, in the stationarized
economy, which evolve according to:




log  at − ga + εa
t+1
log  at − ga + λa log   zt + εaz
t+1
(19)




log   qt − gq + ε
q
t+1




For positive growth rates ﬁrm eﬃciency and quality follows a random walk with negative
drifts. This negative drift determines a ﬁnite expected lifetime for any level of technology
and hence the existence of a stationary distribution in the de-trended economy is guaranteed.
The previous discussion leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 1: Given Ga and Gq growth factors of ﬁrms eﬃciency and quality the economy
admits a Balanced Growth Path along which the mean of the joint distribution of incumbent
ﬁrms and of entrant ﬁrms and the aggregate consumption grow at a rate GaG1−η
q , the price
index decreases at a rate GaG1−η
q , the output distribution grows at a rate Ga/Gη
q, the price
distribution grows at a rate Gq/Gη
a and the number of ﬁrms, the number of entrants, the
aggregate expenditure, the aggregate proﬁts, the proﬁt distribution, and the labor distributions
are constant.
3.2 Growth Rate Determinants
Firms’ Selection and Innovation drive endogenous growth which is then sustained by
entrants’ Imitation. Firm selection results from the assumption of a random walk process for
both the evolution of labor eﬃciency and product quality together with ﬁrm exit. Abstracting
from the endogenous drift introduced by ﬁrms’ innovations, the random walk process, for a
given set of ﬁrms, is characterized by a constant expectation and by a variance that grows
21over time. However, ﬁrms at the bottom of the distribution exit the industry truncating the
joint distribution from below and allowing the distribution to grow only to the right towards
higher level of eﬃciency and quality. The selection of ﬁrms with low eﬃciency and low
quality and the consequent reallocation of resources from these ﬁrms to more technological
advanced ones increases the average eﬃciency and quality of the surviving set of ﬁrms.
When ﬁrms’ innovation with the related endogenous drift is introduced into the random
walk process it reinforces growth. For a given set of innovative ﬁrms, not only the variance
grows over time but also the expectation. The expectation of a ﬁrm technology depends
on the initial state and on the sequence of resources invested in innovation. After every
successful innovation the average technology shifts upwards due to the endogenous drift.
However, innovation has decreasing returns through the log form in which the innovation
drift is modeled. For this reason the resource reallocation eﬀect from non-innovators to
innovators is controlled by the selection eﬀect and the result is that growth is reinforced but
still bounded. Consequently, as time goes by the distribution of incumbent ﬁrms shrinks as
exit is an absorbing state and ﬁrms keep exiting the industry.
Hence, entrants’ imitation is needed to sustain growth and assure the existence of a sta-
tionary distribution with entry and exit. In equilibrium the mass of entrants has to be equal
to the mass of ﬁrms exiting the market. However entrants are on average more productive
than exiting ﬁrms otherwise they would not ﬁnd optimal to enter the market. Since exiting
ﬁrms are replaced by entrants with on average better eﬃciency and quality levels, the re-
sulting ﬁrm distribution moves every period upwards towards higher technological levels.15
Notice that innovation aﬀects growth also allowing for a better imitation.
In the de-trended economy a stationary ﬁrm size distribution arises because the average
technology of the incumbent ﬁrms improves at a rate that it is not too high relative to the
rate at which the technology available to entrants ﬁrms improves. Technically, a station-
ary distribution exists because ﬁrm lifetime is ﬁnite for any (a,q). This is assured by the
combination of decreasing return on innovation and by the downward drift in the random
walk. Any successful ﬁrm which performs innovation will not be an innovator forever but
eventually it will exit the market, leading to a ﬁnite expectation and to a ﬁnite variance of
15Selection and innovation are important to emphasize the fundamental role of reallocation of resources
in the growth process. Growth could still be generated without selection and innovation assuming that the
joint mean of the entrants distribution shifts every period exogenously by g. However in this way growth
would just result from entry and exit.
22the incumbent ﬁrm distribution.
When innovation occurs the eﬃciency and quality processes have also higher variances
of the stochastic component. This increases the probability of a bad shock hitting the
innovative ﬁrms and the dispersion of the innovator distribution against the distribution of
non-innovators and exiting ﬁrms. On the one hand, selection results in a higher average
technology for innovators because relatively bad ﬁrms fall among the pool of non-innovators
resulting in a scenario where only relatively low cost and high quality ﬁrms keep innovating.
On the other hand, the pool of non-innovators becomes larger, implying a higher weight to
the distribution of non-innovators which has a lower average technology. The ﬁnal eﬀect
of higher variances of the innovation random walks on the mean of the joint distribution
is ambiguous.16 However, calibrating the model to match the Spanish data shows that the
positive eﬀect of innovation always outweighs the negative eﬀect.
3.3 Growth Rate Decomposition
On the Balanced Growth Path the growth rate of aggregate and average consumption


























where ¯ X is the average consumption, ˆ x(a,q) is the ﬁrm’s quality weighted output, TxI is
the transition function with the exit and innovation rules and M/I is the entry/exit equilib-
rium rate. The ﬁrst diﬀerence into the squared bracket represents the growth contribution
of selection and innovation. That is, the diﬀerence between the average quality weighted
output of surviving ﬁrms (both innovators and non innovators) and the one of the previous
period incumbents. The more signiﬁcant the innovation investments, the larger TxI  and the
tougher selection, the smaller (1−M/I) . The second diﬀerence instead represents the con-
tribution of entrants’ imitation. The easier or cheaper the imitation mechanism (the smaller
the distance between the entrants’ and incumbents’ distributions) the larger the contribution
of entrants to the aggregate growth.
16The negative eﬀect is then reinforced by the fact that the value function is convex in both states. Thus,
a higher variance impacts the continuation values for the innovation strategies such that they are higher,
relaxing the general cutoﬀ function between innovate or not to innovate. This reduces selection and therefore
growth.
23Adopting the terminology introduced by Poschke (2008),   can be divided into  con,
























γ(a,q) −  exit(a,q)
  
. (22)
The ﬁrst integral catches the share of growth due to ﬁrms’ innovation activities and due to the
idiosyncratic shocks hitting surviving ﬁrms’ level technology.17 The second integral instead
represents the share of growth due to net entry. It is clear that the selection of ineﬃcient
ﬁrms exiting the market and the imitation of new entrants generate positive growth only
if entrants are on average more productive than exiting ﬁrms. This condition holds in the
stationary equilibrium with positive entry. Furthermore, splitting the density of continuing
ﬁrms between the densities of ﬁrms that only produce,  p, and of ﬁrms that innovate and
















(T p(a,q) −  p(a,q)) + (T i(a,q) −  i(a,q))
 
dqda. (23)
Among surviving ﬁrms it is now possible to calculate the share of growth that is due to
only ﬁrms’ experimentation based on the random walk processes without drift and the share
of growth due to both experimentation and ﬁrms’ innovation. The numerical analysis of
the model will then quantify the share of growth due to net entry, innovation, and ﬁrms’
experimentation.
The innovation investments of ﬁrms aﬀect aggregate growth both directly and indirectly
through a better imitation. In fact, innovation results in a higher joint mean of the in-
cumbents’ distribution and hence on entrants that can draw their initial technology from a
distribution that stochastically dominates the distribution of entrants in an economy without
17Without weighting the ﬁrm distribution by the share of quality weighted output the resulting expected
growth rate of the average technology of continuing ﬁrms would be zero. However, given that the optimal
consumption is a convex function of the technology index aq1−η, by Jensen inequality, the average growth
rate of the output weighted technology is positive.
24innovation. Given that ¯   is the key variable in the imitation process, the contribution of

































where AP is the support of surviving ﬁrms that produce but do not innovate while AI =
AA ∪ AQ ∪ AAQ is the support of ﬁrms that produce and innovate. The second integral
captures the contribution of innovation in determining the joint mean of the incumbent
ﬁrms. It is clear that the larger this term, the higher the indirect growth contribution of
innovation via a better imitation.
4 Numerical Analysis
The algorithm, used to solve the model in the stationary equilibrium, is explained in
Appendix D.
4.1 Calibration
Sixteen parameters, linked to ﬁrm dynamics characteristics, ﬁrms speciﬁc innovation
behavior and to the general economic environment, need to be chosen. Since all of them
interact with each other to determine the stationary equilibrium only four of them are
parametrized while twelve are jointly calibrated to match the Spanish manufacturing sector.18
The parameters a priori chosen are the discount factor, β, the preference parameter, α, the
imitation parameter, ψe, and the growth rate of labor productivity, g. β is set equal to 0.95 to
analyze a yearly time span. Accordingly to Ghironi and Melitz (2003), α is set equal to 0.73,
18The Spanish economy has been empirically widely studied in both the dimensions object of this paper:
the new dimension related to ﬁrm innovation behavior and the traditional dimension related to ﬁrm dynamics.
Hence, from the Spanish data it is possible to obtain enough information to calibrate successfully the model.
Similar studies are available also for other European countries (Bartelsman et al. (2004), Bartelsman et al.
(2003) for OECD countries; Ceﬁs and Marsili (2005) for the Netherlands, Smolny (2003) and Fritsch and
Meschede (2001) for Germany).
25so that the price mark-up charged by the monopolistic ﬁrm is of 36% over the marginal cost.
This high mark-up could be seen at odds with the macro literature that delivers a standard
mark-up of around 20% over the marginal/average cost. In this model, a higher mark-up is
justiﬁed by the presence of the ﬁxed costs. In fact, given the free entry condition, ﬁrms on
average break even. On average, ﬁrms price at the average cost leading to reasonaby high
mark-ups over the average cost. Since the aim of this paper is to provide a model able to
disentangle the contribution of eﬃciency and quality improvments in explaining the economy
growth rate and not to test the ability of the model in matching the aggregate growth rate,
g is set equal to 0.042. This number is taken from European Innovation Scoreboard (2001)
and represents the labor productivity growth measured in terms of value added per workers
as average over the nineties. The last parameter chosen is ψe which relates the joint mean
of the entrants distribution with the joint mean of the incumbents. Given the importance
of this parameter in determining the growth rates of the economy it is set individually to
match its empirical counterpart. That is, ψe is chosen such that the average size of entrants
is 38% of the size of incumbent ﬁrms as estimated by Gracia and Puente (2006).
The other twelve parameters are calibrated using a genetic algorithm as described by
Dorsey and Mayer (1995).19 These are: the ratio among the ﬁxed costs, ce/cf, ca/cf, and
cq/cf, the quality parameter η, the four variances of the incumbent random walks σa, σaz,
σq, and σql, the two variances of the entrant random walks, σea and σeq, and ﬁnally the two
parameters that scale the innovation drifts into the stochastic processes, λa and λq. These
parameters jointly determine the shape, the truncation functions of the stationary distribu-
tion of ﬁrms, and the partition of ﬁrms among the diﬀerent innovation strategies. They are
calibrated, using as targets, static and dynamic empirical moments that are informative and
related to the main objective of the paper. It is possible to distinguish between two sets of
targets.
The ﬁrst group refers to a set of moments traditionally used as targets in the ﬁrm dy-
namic literature. These are ﬁrms’ survival rates after two and ﬁve years upon entry, ﬁrms’
yearly turnover rate, the job creation rate due to entry, the fraction of ﬁrms below average
productivity, and the productivity spread, which calibrate the six variances of the model and
19The object of the algorithm is to jointly calibrate the parameters in order to minimize the mean relative
squared deviation of twelve model moments with respect to the corresponding moments in the data. Since
the problem is highly non-linear, the minimization can be characterized by many local minima and the
genetic algorithm used has the nice feature to increase the probability of choosing the global minimum.
26the size of entrants with respect to exiting ﬁrms which gives information about the entry
cost. Accordingly to Garcia and Puente (2006), the two and ﬁve year survival rates for
Spanish manufacturing ﬁrms are estimated to be 82% and 58%, respectively.20 They report
also a yearly ﬁrm turnover rate of 9% and a job creation rate due to entry equal to 3%.21
Garcia and Puente (2006), estimate that entrants ﬁrms are 23% bigger than exiting ﬁrms in
terms of employment. Bartelsman et al. (2004) estimate that the fraction of Spanish ﬁrms
below average productivity is equal to 83%, highlighting a right skewed ﬁrm size distribution.
The last moment is the productivity spread between the 85th and 15th percentile which is
estimated to be between 3 and 4.
The second set of empirical moments used in the calibration gives information related to
the innovation behavior of ﬁrms. The targets used are the share of Spanish manufacturing
ﬁrms performing process innovation, product innovation and the share of ﬁrms that do not
innovate and the intensity of the innovation investments in process and product, respectively.
Given the novelty of these statistics, these moments have not been used before in the litera-
ture. However, in the scope of this paper these are relevant moments that help to calibrate
the ﬁxed cost of process and product innovation, η, λa, and λq. Harrison et al. (2008) work-
ing on data derived from the CIS report that 12.2% of Spanish ﬁrms in the manufacturing
sector declared a process innovation between 1998 and 2000, while 12.4% declare a product
innovation and more than half of the ﬁrms do not innovate in the time span considered. This
numbers are very close to the one published by the National Statistics Institute (www.ine.es)
using the ESEE. The innovation intensity of the Spanish manufacturing sector, computed
as the aggregate innovation expenditure over the aggregate sales, in the 1998 is of 1.71%,
process innovation intensity accounts for 1.26% while product innovation intensity accounts
for the remaining 0.44%.22
Table 2 shows the values assigned to the parameters characterizing the economy. The
20Those numbers are aligned to the one reported by other developed countries as UK, Germany and
Nederland (Bartelsman et al. (2003)).
21Firms’ turnover is computed as the sum of the number of entering and exiting ﬁrms over the total
number of ﬁrms while job creation rate is computed as the total amount of labor employed by entering ﬁrms
in a year divided by the total employment in the same year.
22The European Innovation Scoreboard 2001 reports and innovation intensity for the Spanish manufactur-
ing sector in the 1998 of 2.4% of aggregate sales. This number has been computed on the basis of the CIS
which restricts its sample to ﬁrms with more than ten employees. This can explain the diﬀerent numbers




ce 142.28% Entry cost, % of average ﬁrm size
cf 3.85% Fixed cost, % of average ﬁrm size
ca 31.96% Process innovation cost, % of average ﬁrm size
cq 16.29% Product innovation cost, % of average ﬁrm size
η 0.74 Quality parameter
σa 0.15 Variance of productivity shock
σaz 0.9 Variance of productivity shock with innovation
σq 0.32 Variance of quality shock
σql 1.2 Variance of quality shock with innovation
σea 0.40 Variance of log productivity distribution of entrants
σeq 0.32 Variance of log quality distribution of entrants
λa 0.083 Scale coeﬃcient for process innovation
λq 0.025 Scale coeﬃcient for product innovation
Parametrization
β 0.95 Discount factor
α 0.73 Preference parameter
θ 0.38 Relative entrant mean
g 0.042 Growth rate of labor productivity
ﬁxed costs are expressed in relation to the average employment devoted to production. As
expected the entry cost, which represents a sunk entry investment, is the highest, more
than ten times the operational cost. Reasonable values are attributed to the ﬁxed cost
of both process and product innovation. The parameter associated with the diﬃculty to
produce high quality, η, is just above α and hence such that the optimal output produced
by each ﬁrm is decreasing in the quality dimension. When new ﬁrms enter the market
there is high uncertainty on their proﬁtability, and the probability of surviving the market
28Table 3: Empirical Targets and Model Statistics
Targets Data Model
Targets for Calibration
Share process innovation 12.2% 13.4%
Share no innovation 55.4% 60.92%
Share product innovation 12.4% 11.1%
Product innovation intensity 0.44% 0.5%
Process innovation intensity 1.26% 1.29%
2 year survival rate 0.8 0.74
5 year survival rate 0.58 0.6
Firm turnover rate 0.09 0.086
Firm below average productivity 0.83 0.78
Job creation due to entry 0.03 0.02
Size entrants wrt exiting ﬁrms 1.23 1.31
Productivity spread [2, 3] 2.48
Targets for Parametrization
Entrant size/incumbent size 0.38 0.38
Mark-up over marginal cost 0.37 0.37
competition is low. However, once a ﬁrm survives the ﬁrst selection the growth rate of young
ﬁrms is on average higher than the growth rate of incumbents. This fragility is represented
by a variance of the entrants distribution that is higher than the variance of the random
walk process associated with the evolution of the states when ﬁrms optimally decide to
only produce. Innovation also introduces uncertainty, reﬂected by higher variances of the
corresponding random walk processes. In particular, a very high variance is associated with
product innovation.
Table 3 reports the empirical targets used and the corresponding model moments. Despite
the large number of parameters to calibrate, the model statistics match closely the data in
29both sets of targets. Hence, the innovation choices of ﬁrms, the shape of the distribution, its
dynamic characteristics, and entrants’ behavior seem to reproduce accurately the Spanish
manufacturing sector.
4.2 The Role of Innovation
After setting g equal to 4.2%, the model predicts an annual growth rate of ﬁrms’ produc-
tion eﬃciency, ga, of 2.93% and of product quality, gq, of 4.64%. Using that g ≈ ga+(1−η)gq,
it is fair to conclude that 69.8% of the aggregate growth is due to the growth in ﬁrms’ level
eﬃciency and that only 29.81% is due to the growth in product quality.23 These ﬁgures
are very close to the estimates reported by Huergo and Jamandreu (2004) conﬁrming the
validity of the model in explaining the dynamics of the Spanish manufacturing sector.
Equations (23) and (24) are used to distinguish the eﬀect of innovation, selection, and
imitation in determining the aggregate growth rate. The model predicts that 8.63% of
the growth is due to entry (10.61%) and exit (−1.98%) and the remaining 91.37% is due
to both experimentation and innovation of the ﬁrms that remain active in the industry.24
Deconstracting further this last term into the contribution of the sole ﬁrm’s experimentation
and into the contribution of a ﬁrm’s innovation helps to asses the important role played
by innovation in determining the aggregate growth rate. In fact, the growth contribution of
ﬁrms that are and remain only producers is negative (−8.34% of the 91.37%). These ﬁrms are
characterized by a low level of technology and are destined to exit the market after a series
of bad shocks. The high likelihood of receiveing a bad shock and the ﬁrm’s powerlesseness
to escape exit explains their negative contribution to growth. However, this negative eﬀect
is more than compensated by the growth contribution of innovative ﬁrms that develops to
23In equilibrium (1+g) = (1+ga)(1+gq)(1−η) holds. Approximating it using a logarithmic transformation
yields g ≈ ga + (1 − η)gq.
24Puente and Garcia (2006) estimate that entry and exit account only for 5% of the productivity growth of
Spanish ﬁrms. This number is much lower with respect to the ones that are typically found in the literaute.
For istance, Bartelsman et al. (2004) working on a panel of 24 OECD countries over the nineties ﬁnd that
between 20% and 50% of aggregate productivity growth is due to entry and exit of ﬁrms. This numbers are
in line with the US data. Foster et al. (2001) ﬁnd that in the U.S. Census Manufactures, more than a quarter
of the increase in aggregate productivity between 1997 and 1978 was due to entry and exit. Moreover, Lenz
and Mortensen (2008) estimating their model on a panel of Danish ﬁrms ﬁnd that entry and exit of ﬁrms
can account for 20% of the aggregate growth while within ﬁrm growth account for 55%.
30be the leading force of aggregate growth.
Additionally, innovative ﬁrms have a higher weighted mean of their technology index than
ﬁrms that do not innovate. This implies that innovation increases the weighted mean of the
technology distribution of active ﬁrms, that is used as reference by the entering ﬁrms. Hence
innovation also means better imitation and therefore higher growth. Applying equation (25),
it is possible to conclude that 84.31% of the joint mean is due to the average technology
level reached by the innovative ﬁrms.
4.3 Firms Partition and Cutoﬀ Functions
Figure 1 displays how the two attributes of ﬁrm heterogeneity together with the ﬁxed
operational and innovation costs determine the partition of ﬁrms between those exiting and
remaining, and among process innovators, product innovators, and both types of innovators
or non-innovators. Hence, it illustrates the equilibrium cutoﬀ functions and the combinations
of eﬃciency (x-axis) and quality (y-axis) for which the diﬀerent choices faced by ﬁrms are
optimal. The ﬁrm distribution over the two dimensions of technology (Figure 2, left) shows
that the ﬁrm distribution is right skewed in both states and that the largest mass of ﬁrms is
concentrated in the bottom-left corner. This information complements the partition of ﬁrms
and strengthens the subsequent interpretation.
The ﬁrst area on the left represents the ﬁrms with production eﬃciency and product
quality lower than ax(q) which optimally exit the market. These area represent about 9%
of the total mass of ﬁrms. The exit cutoﬀ function is the border between the exit region
and the region where ﬁrms remain active and only produce. Due to the trade-oﬀ between
quality and eﬃciency this cutoﬀ function is decreasing in quality: relatively high cost ﬁrms
can survive longer in the market when the quality of the variety they produce is high. In
the second region, for slightly higher level of eﬃciency and quality, ﬁrms are suﬃciently
proﬁtable to stay in the market but not enough to innovate, v(a,q) = vP(a,q). These are
ﬁrms with relatively high level of cost but with all the possible levels of quality. In fact,
product quality has a lower impact on ﬁrm proﬁtability than productivity.
Moving along the eﬃciency dimension, for relatively small level of quality, it is optimal
for ﬁrms to pay ca and undertake process innovation while for relatively high level of quality
it is optima to pay cq and undertake product innovation. This is the result of the interplay

























Figure 1: Firms Partition
the eﬃciency level reached by the ﬁrm the higher the gain in terms of proﬁtability resulting
from a marginal reduction of the production cost. This explains why it is optimal for ﬁrms
to innovate in process when their eﬃciency has already reached a minimum level. The same
is true for the quality dimension, though the proﬁt function is concave in q. However this
disadvantage is compensated by the lower ﬁxed cost of product innovation. The last region
is represented by ﬁrms with high eﬃciency and high quality that optimally innovate in both
process and product.
Table 4: Conditional Probabilities
Exit No Innovation Process Product Both
No Innovation 5.1% 87.84% 0.84% 5.6% 0.21%
Process 0 4.5% 75.9% 0.95% 18.65%
Product 0 34.65% 1.22% 51.84% 12.3%
Both 0 1.83% 33.26% 3.3% 61.61%
Table 4 shows the equilibrium conditional probabilities of switching actions after a one-
year period given the current decision of the ﬁrms.25 The ﬁrst column lists the current action
25This information is contained in the optimal transition function TXI and the derivations are in the
Appendix.
32of the ﬁrms and the rows give the transition probabilities of each future decision. Due to
the persistence of the random walk process a high probability is attached to the repetition
of the current action. Interestingly, consistent with empirical evidence, this persistence
appears less strong in the case of product innovators: 34% of product innovators today will
not innovate tomorrow while 15% will switch to process innovation, both alone and with
product innovation, and only 51% will repeat an innovation in product quality. The relative
low persistence in quality enhancing innovation is due to the high variance associated with
this decision. A high variance implies that the probability of receiving a bad shock is high
as well as the probability of switching to a diﬀernt strategy. Empirical evidence emphasises
that exit is associated with a low level of pre-exit innovation (Huergo and Jamandreu (2004)
for evidence on Spanish ﬁrms). This model predicts that a ﬁrm exits the market with 5% of
probabilty only if in the current year no innovation has been introduced. This also implies
















































Figure 2: Bivariate and Univariate Firms Distribution
The equilibrium distribution of ﬁrms is determined endogenously and it is shaped by the
static and dynamic decisions of incumbent ﬁrms together with entrants imitation. Figure
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Figure 3: Conditional Firms Size Distributions
2, left panel, shows the bivariate ﬁrms distribution over the two attributes of ﬁrm hetero-
geneity. However, empirical studies are not able to distinguish these two dimensions and
hence Figure 2, right panel, displays the corresponding univariate ﬁrm size distribution over
a technological index that summarizes the information contained in a and q. That is, aq1−η.
Notice that this is the equivalent of the employment distribution of ﬁrms which is observed
in the data. The univariate ﬁrm distribution looks right skewed and hence with a right thick
tail (the moments of the distribution are reported in Table 5).26 A Generalized Extreme
Value distribution ﬁts it best, though the more widely used log-normal distribution is not
inadeguate. Empirically there is not much information about the moments of the size distri-
bution of the Spanish manufacturing sector and only few empirical works such as Doraszelski
and Jaumandreu (2007) have analyzed it. They conclude that the distribution of Spanish
ﬁrms in the manufacturing sectors is right skewed.
The conditional distribution of ﬁrms that only produce and do not innovate is concen-
trated at lower levels of the technological index aq1−η than the conditional distributions
of innovators (Figure 3 and Table 5). Consistently with the empirical evidence innovative
ﬁrms have a higher labor productivity and are bigger than ﬁrms that do not innovate. The
26The underlying distribution used to compute the skewness is a log-normal distribution.
34comparison among innovators is more interestingly: on average small ﬁrms do product in-
novation, medium and large ﬁrms do both product and process innovation and large ﬁrms
do process innovation. Finally, the conditional distribution of product innovators is more
right skewed than the distribution of ﬁrms that do process innovation or do not innovate.
Also this last feature is conﬁrmed by empirical estimations of the ﬁrm size distribution in
the Spanish manufacturing sector.27
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics of Firms Distributions
Mean Variance Coef. of Variation Skewness
Size Distribution 2.41 3.05 0.72 0.95
Cond. on Process Innov. 5.9 1.26 0.19 0.89
Cond. on Product Innov. 2.08 0.24 0.23 2.32
Cond. on Both Innov. 4.63 0.98 0.21 1.1
Cond. on No innovation 1.67 3.05 0.44 0.95
5 Comparative Statics
This section analyzes how changes in the key parameters of the model, which characterize
the industry structure, aﬀect the process of labor reallocation among ﬁrms and hence the
equilibrium growth rates of the economy. In particular, changes in the innovation costs,
ca and cq, as well as changes in the entry cost, ce, are analyzed. Both types of costs are
directly linked to growth: changes in ca and cq bring changes in the composition of the
pool of innovative ﬁrms and changes in ce aﬀect the imitation process of entrants ﬁrms.
High entry cost are seen as barrier to enter the industry and they are often regarded as a
protection of incumbent ﬁrms and hence as a stimulus to innovation. On the other hand,
high innovation costs are seen as detrimental of innovation. Hence, it becomes important to
understand how the economy responds to changes in these key features in order to design
27Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2007) ﬁnd that the distribution of process innovators have a higher mean
than the distribution of ﬁrms that do not innovate and that the distribution of product innovators are also
more skewed.
35policy recommendations aimed at fostering growth. The ﬁrst part of this section discusses
changes in the dynamic and static characteristics of the industry as well as changes in the
growth rates of eﬃciency, ga, and quality, gq, for ﬁxed g, while the second part considers
how the aggregate growth rate, g, changes as the key parameters changed, ﬁxing the relation





























































































Share of No Innovators for Difefrent ca and cr
ca
Figure 4: Comparative statics for diﬀerent ca and cr, given g
5.1 Comparative Statics for Given g
Figure 4 and 5 show how the exit rate, the share of growth due to net entry, the ﬁrms
partition, and the growth rate of eﬃciency and quality change as the innovation costs, ca
(y-axis) and cq (x-axis) change. As the innovation costs decline ga increases which, given a
constant g, implies that gq declines. Everything else equals a reduction in the innovation
costs mainly beneﬁts process innovators. Hence, the share of aggregate growth explained by
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Figure 5: ga (top) and gq (bottom) for diﬀerent ca and cr, given g
ﬁrms’ proﬁtability. Moreover, both ga and gq are more sensitive to changes in the cost of
undertaking process innovation than product innovation. This last feature can be clearly
observed plotting the isoquants of the growth rates (right pictures in Figure 5). However,
the highest level of ga (equal to 3.21%) is reached by a zero cost of doing product innovation
and a small but positive cost of doing process innovation. In fact, a positive ca not only
allows for a higher share of innovators but also for a sizeable selection as can be shown in the
ﬁrst two pictures of Figure 4. Hence, both growth channels are strong. The same is not true
when both innovation costs are equal to zero. In this scenario, innovation is very cheap and
many ﬁrms innovate. However, being ca and cq equal to zero, the labor demand decreases
and hence the wage rate decrases reducing the exit rate and hence ﬁrms’ turnover. For zero
cost of innovation the selection mechanism is not at work. The last feature to consider is the
diﬀerent reaction of the share of process and product innovators to changes in the innovation
costs shaped by the comparative advantages of one type of innovation with respect to the
other.
An increase in the entry cost leads in equilibrium to a higher expected value of entry
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Figure 6: Comparative Statics for diﬀerent ce, given g





























Figure 7: ga and gq for diﬀerent ce, given g
38which in turn implies that the discounted expected proﬁts of incumbent ﬁrms need to be
higher. The exit cutoﬀ function shifts to the left and hence ﬁrms survival becomes easier.
The turnover rate reduces and as a consequence the share of growth that is due to entry and
exit progressively declines in favor of the share of growth due to innovation. Indeed higher
expected proﬁts lead to more innovators and hence the share of growth due to incumbents
ﬁrms increases to meet the ﬁxed growth rate g (Figure 6). Interestingly, as the entry cost
increases, the growth rates of eﬃciency reduces slightly and the growth rate of quality in-
creases (Figure 7). Hence, a more concentrated industry favors product quality innovations.
When a ﬁrm’s market share is already large, ﬁrms beneﬁt from increasing the quality of their
variety.
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Figure 8: Comparative statics for diﬀerent ca and cr, varying g
The quantitative analysis in Section 4.3 permits the conclusion that eﬃciency growth
explains 69.8% of the aggregate growth. Here this information is used to ﬁx the ratio
between ga and g and to use the calibrated algorithm to determine endogenously g.
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Figure 9: g for diﬀerent ca and cr






































































































































































Figure 10: Comparative Statics for diﬀerent ce, varying g
costs of innovation: on the x-axis the cost of doing product innovation, cq, while on the
y-axis the cost of doing process innovation, ca. As both the innovation ﬁxed costs decline
two opposite eﬀects arise. On the one hand, innovation becomes cheaper and more ﬁrms
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Figure 11: g for diﬀerent ce
ﬁnd it proﬁtable. Hence the pool of innovative ﬁrms increases and this aﬀects positively and
directly the growth rate of the economy (Figure 8). This positive eﬀect is then reinforced
by an indirect eﬀect. If the mass of innovators is larger, more ﬁrms will pay the ﬁxed
costs. This sustains the demand of labor and hence the wage rate, thus assuring a strong
selection. On the other hand, if the innovation costs are reduced, less labor is demanded
by the individual innovative ﬁrm. Consequently, the demand of labor by an innovative ﬁrm
declines and hence the real wage declines to satisfy the labor market clearing condition. A
lower wage translates into a weaker selection and hence in a lower eﬀect on the economy
growth rate. The ﬁnal response of the growth rate to the changes in the innovation costs
results from the combination of these two eﬀects. Generally, the positive eﬀect prevails. The
lower the innovation costs, the higher the growth rate. This holds true for all the values of
the ﬁxed cost of undertaking product innovation but only for high and intermediate value of
the ﬁxed cost of doing process innovation. The maximum growth rate is obtained for cq = 0
but small and positive ca, showing that for very low levels of ca the negative eﬀect oﬀsets the
positive one. Additionally, the economy growth rate is more sensitive to changes in ca than
to changes in cq. Hence, a policy aimed at promoting only growth would be more successful
when used to address an increase in process innovation.
Finally, when entry cost are low, imitation is cheap, and many ﬁrms enter and exit
the market, which results in a high growth rate (Figure 11). As the entry cost increases,
41ﬁrms’ selection and imitation become weaker and the growth rate declines. For relatively
low level of ce this decline is reinforced by a reduction in the number of innovators: new
entrants pay a higher cost and this increases the labor demand and wage rate, and hence
innovation becomes more expensive. This negative trend in the number of innovators remains
for process innovators while it becomes positive for product innovators as ce increases. The
industry becomes more and more concentrated due to costly imitation, and the market
share of each incumbent increases leading to more product innovation. Product innovation
has a lower impact on g than process innovation, and though the number of innovators is
higher, the growth rate is lower than in a industry characterized by lower barriers to enter
and higher competition. However, though the share of process innovators declines as the
industry becomes more concentrated it is still higher than the share of product innovators
(Figure 10).
6 Final Remarks
This paper proposes an endogenous growth model with heterogeneous ﬁrms where ﬁrms
diﬀer in two dimensions: production eﬃciency and product quality. Both dimensions are
subject to idiosyncratic permanent shocks but ﬁrms can aﬀect endogenously their evolution
through process, product or both types of innovations. Growth arises due to incumbent
ﬁrms’ innovation and selection and is sustained by entrants’ imitation. Selection eliminates
the ineﬃcient ﬁrms from the market, thereby increasing the average productivity of incum-
bents. Innovation ampliﬁes this not only increasing directly the average technology of ﬁrms
but also increasing selection. Entrants imitate the average incumbent and are, on average,
more productive than exiting ﬁrms. The result is that the ﬁrm distribution shifts upwards,
generating growth.
The economy is calibrated to the Spanish manufacturing sector and closely matches static
and dynamic moments related to the ﬁrms’ distribution and new moments related to the
innovation behavior of ﬁrms. Hence, the model provides an accurate representation of the
Spanish economy and an explanation of the heterogeneity in the innovation activities among
ﬁrms. Firms’ process innovation explains 69.8% of the aggregate growth while product inno-
vation contributes only for the remaining 30.2%. When decomposing the aggregate growth
rate between the contribution of innovative and surviving ﬁrms and the net contribution of
42entering and exiting ﬁrms, the role of innovation is substantive: 91.87% of growth is due to
innovation. Innovation is also necessary to survive market competion: only non-innovative
ﬁrms exit the industry. An unanswered question is to identify which type of innovation,
between process and product innovation, allows for a greater period of ﬁrms’ longevity.
The endogenous ﬁrm size distribution is right skewed and approximated well by a log-
normal distribution. The conditional distributions of innovators are consistent with the data:
innovators are larger than non-innovators and in the case of product innovators also more
right skewed. Additionally, small ﬁrms do product innovation, intermediate ﬁrms do both
product and process innovation and large ﬁrms do process innovation only. Hence, there is a
non-monotonic relation between ﬁrm size and innovation though ﬁrm size is still an indicator
of the type of innovation undertaken by ﬁrms. For given aggregate growth rate, industries
characterized by lower innovation costs have a higher contribution of the growth rate of ﬁrm
eﬃciency. Hence, when innovation is cheap there are more process innovators driving the
growth of the industry. On the other hand, when the entry barriers are increased the share
of all types of innovators increases and the growth contribution of product quality becomes
more important. The industry growth rate reacts positively to reductions in the innovation
costs, however the model predicts that its maximum is reached for a positive but small cost
of process innovation. Though entry barriers protect and stimulates innovation, growth is
maximized for relatively low entry costs which are accompanied by a more dynamic industry
with a high turnover and a higher share of process innovators. As the industry becomes more
concentrated, the aggregate share of innovators increases but in favor of product innovators
and both types of innovators which impact growth less strongly as process innovators.
These considerations leads to attractive policy recommendations aimed at fostering growth
and welfare. The next step is therefore to compute the optimal allocation and design inno-
vation policies that can implement the ﬁrst best in the decentralized economy.
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Appendix
A Innovation Cutoﬀ Functions
Deﬁne AP = {(a,q) : a ∈ A,q ∈ Q ∧ v(a,q) = vP(a,q)} the production support,
AA = {(a,q) : a ∈ A,q ∈ Q ∧ v(a,q) = vA(a,q)} the process innovation support, AQ =
{(a,q) : a ∈ A,q ∈ Q ∧ v(a,q) = vQ(a,q)} the product innovation support and AAQ =
{(a,q) : a ∈ A,q ∈ Q ∧ v(a,q) = vAQ(a,q)} the process and product innovation support.
Moreover, let B = {(a+ǫ,q+ǫ)} for |ǫ| > 0 arbitrarily small. The innovation cutoﬀ function
are deﬁned as aA = {(a,q) : (a,q) ∈ AA ∧(AP ∪AQ ∪AAQ)\AA  = ∅}, aQ = {(a,q) : (a,q) ∈
AQ∧(AP∪AA∪AAQ)\AQ  = ∅} and aAQ = {(a,q) : (a,q) ∈ AAQ∧(AP∪AA∪AQ)\AAQ  = ∅}.
B Aggregate Variables
Using the information contained in equation (19), the price index, the aggregate con-





































= Iπ( ). (27)
C Growth Rate Disaggregation
On the Balanced Growth Path, given that the number of ﬁrms is constant, the growth

























Q ˆ x(a,q)α 








where TxI is the optimal transition function with the exit and innovation rules. Adding and




Q ˆ x(a,q)α((1 − M/I) (a,q) + M/I (a,q)) to the numerator and
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The last step to obtain the growth rate decomposition consists in taking the logarithm of
both terms of the equation and approximating them using the rule ln(G) ≈ g, given that g





















γ(a,q) −  (a,q)
   
, (32)
which is equation (29) in the main body of the paper.
47D Algorithm
The state space A×Q is discretized. The grid chosen is of 30 points for each state yield-
ing 900 technology combinations, (a,q).28 Firms’ value function is computed through value
function iteration. The unknown variables are the growth rates ga and gq which combines in
the growth rate of the aggregate technology g and the aggregate expenditure and price index
summarized by k = P
α
1−αE. The growth rate of labor productivity, g, is ﬁxed exogenously.
For given ga, gq = (G/Ga)
1
1−η − 1, and k compute the stationary proﬁt   π(a,q;ga,k) and
then the ﬁrm value function   v(a,q;ga,k).29 While iterating the value function, the optimal
policies for the investment in process and product innovation,   z(a,q;ga,k) and   l(a,q;ga,k),
are computed and the random walk processes, that govern the transition of ﬁrm productivity
and product quality, are approximated using the method explained by Tauchen (1987). This
step is time consuming since each ﬁrm’s problem has to be solved via ﬁrst order conditions
for each single couple of states, (a,q), till convergence is reached. Once the value func-
tion is approximated the algorithm computes the cutoﬀ functions ax(q;ga,k), aA(q;ga,k),
aQ(a;ga,k), and aAQ(q;ga,k). Then the transition matrix ΦxI is computed. This is the
ﬁnal transition matrix which takes into account the exit and the innovation decisions. Af-
ter guessing an initial distribution for entrant ﬁrms and normalizing its initial joint mean
to zero, the expected value of entry is computed. The free entry condition is used to pin
down the equilibrium value of k resulting from the ﬁrst iteration of the algorithm. Using the
equilibrium k, the ﬁrm value, the cutoﬀ functions, and the transition matrix can be found
for given initial ga. The binomial ﬁrm distribution is then determined using the formula for
the ergodic distribution     = (I − TxI)−1G as proved by Hopenhayn (1992). The algorithm
is closed using the condition on the mean of the entrant distribution, γe = ψe , and pinning
down the equilibrium growth rate, ga, that satisﬁes this equation. Once ga is determined, gq
28The choice of 30 grid points for each state is due to the fact that the algorithm is computationally heavy
given the presence of two states and the endogenization of the dynamic choice of the innovation investment.
On the one hand, increasing the grid size would improve the precision of the calibration but would not aﬀect
qualitatively the results. On the other hand, the technology combination (a,q) available to ﬁrms would
increase quadratically in the grid size and the code would eventually become unfeasible. Hence, given that
the results are not qualitatively aﬀected by the grid size, a quality and productivity grid of 30 points is a
reasonable restriction.
29Notice that all the variables depend on both ga and gq. However for notational convenience gq is omitted
since it is a function of ga.
48is determined as well. All these steps are repeated until all conditions are jointly satisﬁed
and convergence is reached.
E Conditional Probabilities
The ﬁnal transition function TXI(a′,q′|a,q) contains all the information to compute the
probability that tomorrow a ﬁrm will optimally decide to do action Y ∈ A′ given that
today it chose action X ∈ A where A′ ={Exit, Not to Innovate, Do Process Innovation, Do
Product Innovation, Do Both Innovations} and A ={Not to Innovate, Do Process Innovation,
Do Product Innovation, Do Both Innovations}. Weighting these probabilities by the ﬁrm
density in each state allows to calculate the fraction of ﬁrms that today chose action X and
tomorrow will switch to action Y . Simplify the notation and deﬁne a vector of states, s, of all
the possible combinations of a and q couples. Indicating with ”′” the next period variables
the conditional probabilities are computed as follows
P(Y |X) =
1  
s:A=X  (s)ds
 
s′:A′=Y
 
s:A=X
φ(s
′|s) (s)dsds
′. (33)
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